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Abstract 
This paper reports findings from the evaluation of the Direct Payments in Residential 
Care Trailblazers in England (2014-16). It focuses on the perspective of residential 
care providers on implementing direct payments, which were aimed at improving the 
level of choice and control over care available to their residents. The paper explores 
the views of providers using interviews and survey responses of care home 
managers and owners. Concerns expressed by providers include issues that have 
arisen in domiciliary care but also issues specific to residential care, especially 
challenges in facilitating greater choice and control in settings that provide care 





Evaluating Direct Payments in Residential Care: the perspective of care home 
providers 
Introduction 
In 2012, the Department of Health in England decided to initiate a pilot programme to 
test the introduction of direct payments in residential care. This followed a 
recommendation by the Law Commission in 2011, which had advised the 
Government to consider whether direct payments, then available to pay for 
domiciliary care and short periods of respite and replacement residential care, could 
be extended to those requiring permanent long-term residential care (Law 
Commission, 2011). While the Commission noted that care home residents should 
have equal access to direct payments and, by extension, improved choice and 
control over their care, it acknowledged that there were “practical questions 
concerning the economics of care home provision” that needed to be investigated 
(Law Commission, 2011: 103). It was also hoped that direct payments would 
contribute to the Government’s agenda of improving the personalisation of care, for 
which, in domiciliary care, direct payments had emerged to be the main tool.  
To address these questions, the Department of Health (now known as the 
Department for Health and Social Care) invited local authorities with responsibility for 
adult social services to express their interest in testing the feasibility of direct 
payments in residential care. The Department chose 20 of those that expressed 
interest to pilot them and decided to commission an evaluation of the pilots. It 
required local authorities to liaise with residential care providers in their areas and 
enlist their support.  
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Before the evaluation started, the Department decided to enable all local authorities 
in England to offer direct payments in residential care from 2016 and rebranded the 
pilots as ‘trailblazers’. The plan was that the remaining local authorities would learn 
from the experience of the trailblazers and that direct payments would be made 
available to all residents in care homes from April 2016. However, in 2015, towards 
the end of the evaluation, the Department decided to postpone the roll-out until at 
least 2020.   
The Department commissioned the Policy Innovation Research Unit (PIRU) to 
conduct an independent evaluation of the trailblazer programme. The research team 
comprised a partnership of researchers at the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine and the Personal Social Services Research Unit at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science. The evaluation took place between 
January 2014 and June 2016, and the final report was published in 2017 (Ettelt et 
al., 2017). The aims of the evaluation were to understand how direct payments could 
be introduced in residential care and to assess the potential impact of direct 
payments on care home residents, their families, local authorities and care home 
providers. The implementation of the programme proved slower and more difficult 
than anticipated: only 71 care home residents accepted the offer of a direct payment 
and only 40 direct payments were actually implemented in autumn 2015. This was 
far less than the 400 or more originally expected by local authorities (Ettelt et al 
2017).   
The overall aims, methods and findings of our evaluation are presented in the final 
report of the evaluation (Ettelt et al, 2017). We found significant barriers to 
implementing direct payments in residential care, including a lack of clarity about the 
benefits of direct payments to care home residents, especially for older people with 
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dementia, a limited range of choices of services for residents, and concerns from 
providers about the impact of direct payments on their financial sustainability (Ettelt 
et al., 2017, Williams et al., 2016, Ettelt et al., 2018).   
 This paper explores in more depth the views and experiences of care home 
providers. It aims to contribute to the limited literature on the perspective of providers 
on policy changes concerning residential care by exploring two questions: 
1. What were the experiences of residential care providers participating in the 
Direct Payments in Residential Care Trailblazers? 
2. How did care home providers view the effects of direct payments on their 
homes and on service users and their families?  
More specifically, the paper interrogates the perspectives of care home providers in 
terms of five themes: (1) the motivation of providers to participate in the programme; 
(2) providers’ views on how direct payments were used in their homes; (3) the 
potential of direct payments to promote personalisation of care in residential settings; 
(4) concerns about the financial implications of direct payments for care homes; and 
(5) concerns about potential abuse and failure to safeguard residents associated 
with direct payments. The findings provide insight into the challenges experienced 
when implementing direct payments in the care home context that may explain, in 
part, why relatively few direct payments were set up during the trailblazer 
programme.  
 
Provision and funding of adult residential care in England 
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In England, most adult social care is provided to people in their own homes. For 
people with more severe care needs who are unable to live in their own homes or 
with family, care homes provide accommodation with either personal care or a 
combination of personal care and nursing care. There are currently 16,143 care 
homes in England registered with the national regulator, the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC, 2017); 83% of care home beds are provided by homes run by 
private, for-profit firms, 13% by the voluntary sector and 4% by local government or 
the National Health Service (NHS). Around half of care home residents are funded 
by their local authority, with the authority purchasing care direct from the providers.  
However 41% of care home residents pay for their care themselves as ‘self-funders’ 
(CMA, 2017). This is because local authority support for adult social care in England 
is subject to a financial means test as well as an assessment of support needs 
against eligibility criteria, and only people with savings below £23,250 are eligible for 
local authority-funded care. [The remaining 10% of care home residents are fully 
funded by the NHS under ‘continuing health care’ arrangements that cover people 
with severe long-term complex health needs.] The direct payment trailblazer 
programme however related only to residents funded by local authorities.   
The care home fees agreed between local authorities and the care homes with which 
they have contracts vary between local authorities, between care homes and 
between user groups of services. Local authorities pay higher fees for younger 
residents (aged 18 to 64) than for older residents (aged 65 and over), enabling more 
day care activities to be provided for younger residents (NHS Digital, 2017). 
Direct payments are defined as ‘money given to individuals by social services 
departments to buy the support they have been assessed as needing’ (SCIE, 2005). 
There are several reasons to expect that direct payments in residential care would 
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differ in practice from direct payments in domiciliary care and that the views of 
providers of residential care would reflect at least some of these differences. Care 
home residents in general have higher support needs than users of domiciliary care 
services. For example, almost 70% of people aged 65 and older living in care homes 
in England have dementia, compared with less than 6% of those receiving care in 
their own homes (Matthews et al., 2013). They are therefore more likely to require 
assistance to request and manage a direct payment.  
Care homes are designed to provide services collectively for groups of residents. On 
average, care homes have 40 beds, with the optimum size considered to be around 
60-70 beds (CMA 2017). Care homes often provide services based on ‘block 
contracts’, i.e. long-term contracts with a local authority for a specified number of 
residents at a fixed rate. They rely on economies of scale: provision of 24-hour care 
does not require a 1:1 staff to service user ratio in a care home as it does in 
domiciliary care. Pressures on resources and heavy workloads can leave care home 
staff unable to spend much time with residents on a one-to-one basis (Talbot and 
Brewer, 2016, Coughlan and Ward, 2007, McGilton and Boscart, 2006).  
The Department of Health provided monies to the local authorities concerned to 
meet their administrative costs in running their trailblazer schemes, but did not 
provide resources to enable them to meet higher costs of care: the programme was 
intended to be cost-neutral other than with respect to administrative costs. A study of 
the introduction of nursing home vouchers in the Valencia region in Spain found, that 
the scheme was able to improve residents’ choice of service, but that this extension 
of choice also came at additional costs (Angeles Tortosa and Granell, 2002). 
Resources for such additional costs were not provided in the English programme. 
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More generally, central  government reduced its grant allocation to local authorities 
in England by 37% in real terms between 2010/11 and 2015/16 (NAO, 2014). As a 
consequence, almost all local authorities reduced their spending on adult social care, 
often by freezing, or seeking opportunities to reduce, care home fees. These cuts, 
along with increasing costs for providers, high staff vacancy rates and the 
increasingly complex needs of adults in long-term care, have meant that the fee 
levels set by some authorities for care homes are so low as to be “potentially 
unsustainable” (NAO, 2016). 
Between 2010 and 2015, the number of residential care homes declined by 12%, 
with 2,444 closures in this period (CQC, 2016: 62). The majority – 59% – of these 
homes were small, with ten beds or fewer, which suggests they may have been less 
resilient to financial pressures. However it is not known to what extent these closures 
were driven by the cuts to local authority budgets and low rates paid by councils for 
care home services. 
 
Experience of direct payments in domiciliary care 
In England, direct payments have been introduced in 1995 for a restricted group of 
service users. Since then, direct payments have become a key method for promoting 
personalisation in domiciliary adult social care and they are now the Government’s 
‘preferred mechanism’ of allocating public funding for adult social care services 
(Needham, 2011, DH 2014). The idea behind direct payments is that by enabling 
service users to make their own purchasing decisions, they would be able to select 
services that best meet their needs and therefore receive a more ‘personalised’ and 
cost-effective service (Leadbeater et al. 2008). 
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There is a substantial literature on the effects of direct payments on different user 
groups, indicating that direct payments provide service users with additional choices. 
Such effects are dependent on a variety of factors, such as the availability of options 
in the local care market and strategies to support service users in employing their 
own personal assistants (Arksey and Baxter, 2012, Fernandez et al., 2007, Glasby 
and Littlechild, 2016). The experience of using direct payments in domiciliary care 
suggests that younger adults are more likely to benefit from a direct payment than 
are older people. Older people may also be more reluctant to take up direct 
payments compared with younger people, and may need more support to manage 
them (Glendinning et al., 2008, Clark et al., 2004, Woolham et al., 2017).  
There is little research on the experience of providers of direct payments, however. 
When direct payments were introduced in the mid-1990s for some user groups, there 
was a significant increase in the number of personal assistants employed, leading to 
concern as to whether the supply and quality of assistants would be able to meet 
demand (Scourfield, 2005). The restricted availability of qualified paid care workers 
was a particular problem for service users whose direct payment allowed them to 
pay for only a small number of hours of care per week (Clark et al., 2004). The 
evaluation of pilots of individual budgets (a similar concept that aimed to bring 
together different sources of funding) suggested that many home care providers 
were reluctant to provide individual budgets (Glendinning et al., 2008). Of those who 
participated, some were very positive, while others felt that policymakers promoting 
individual budgets had overestimated the range of choices that could conceivably be 
made available to users. Other concerns included that the limited amount of money 
available meant giving additional choices would compromise existing services; that 
9 
 
users might not pay their bills; and the risk of financial abuse (Glendinning et al., 
2008, Manthorpe et al., 2009).  
 
Methods 
This paper draws on a survey of care home managers and owners, interviews with a 
sub-sample of care home managers and owners in selected areas, and interviews 
with representatives of national provider organisations. While we specifically focus 
on the perspectives of providers, the findings are supported by the larger set of data 
analysed for the evaluation (Ettelt et al., 2017). These include a survey of service 
users and family members who had accepted or declined the offer of a direct 
payment, and a follow-up survey after six months of those who had accepted a direct 
payment; annual interviews with project managers in each participating local 
authority over three years; face-to-face interviews with local authority staff in five 
sites selected for in-depth study; interviews with service users and family members 
accepting or declining a direct payment in these sites; and data on the cost to local 
authorities of setting up direct payments in residential care (Ettelt et al., 2017).  
An online survey of care home providers was conducted between November 2015 
and March 2016 to capture the experience of care home managers, owners or other 
senior care home staff. The survey was aimed at staff from care homes that had 
participated in the Trailblazer scheme, those that had decided not to participate, and 
those that expressed interest in participating but did not have a direct payment user 
at the time.  
Questions were derived from analysis of interviews carried out as part of the 
evaluation, as well as from findings from an initial scoping study and published 
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literature (Ettelt et al., 2013). Most questions were quantitative, with a smaller 
number of open-ended, questions. The survey was piloted by three care home 
managers. A total of 631 invitations were sent by email to care homes in ten sites (all 
had been informed about the scheme by their local authority) with a link to the online 
survey, hosted by online questionnaire provider Survey Monkey. The care home 
survey questionnaire is available in the appendix of the final report of the evaluation 
(Ettelt et al, 2017). 
One hundred and fourteen responses to the survey were received. After the removal 
of incomplete responses and responses that indicated misunderstanding of the 
questions, 85 were included in the analysis, representing a response rate of around 
13%. The 85 survey responses related to 70 care homes reporting no direct payment 
users and 15 care homes reporting one or two direct payment users, reflecting the 
small scale of the Trailblazers. The characteristics of the care homes can be found in 
Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In view of these small numbers, the results of the survey are presented as cardinal 
numbers as opposed to percentages. It is not known whether the same care home 
manages or owners who took part in the interviews also responded to the survey, as 
the responses from the survey were anonymous. 
Sixteen respondents stated they were participating in the scheme in principle but 
said none of their residents had been offered a direct payment; 12 said they were 
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participating but that no resident had accepted a direct payment; 36 said they were 
not participating. Almost all the non-participating care homes indicated that they had 
not received information about the direct payment programme from their local 
authority, despite being in a Trailblazer area (although the local authority believed 
that it had informed these care homes).  
Nineteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with care home managers and 
owners involved in planning and implementing direct payments across five sites 
(Table 2). The sites were selected on the basis that they represented different 
approaches to implementing direct payments in residential care, i.e. as ‘full’ or ‘part’ 
direct payment or both, aimed at different groups of service users such as younger 
people with physical or learning disabilities or mental health problems or older 
people. The interviews explored their understanding of the programme, their 
concerns and thoughts at the beginning of the programme, and their experience of 
its implementation. (The detailed topic guide is available in the appendix of the final 
report.)  
The interviews involved managers and owners from a variety of care homes of 
different types and sizes. The smallest home in the sample had places for six 
residents with moderate learning disabilities, while the largest had capacity for over 
100 older people with personal care and nursing care needs. All interviewees were 
from providers offering residential care, with four offering residential and nursing 
care; there were local authority-funded residents in all the homes, and some 
reported that all their residents were funded by the local authority. Eighteen 
interviewees represented care homes involved in the scheme, while one had 
decided against participating. Interviewees also received an invitation to participate 




[Table 2 about here] 
 
Interviews were also conducted with representatives of national stakeholder 
organisations. There were seven in total, including provider associations from the 
private and charitable sector (Care England, the National Care Forum and the 
Registered Nursing Homes Association) and organisations representing service 
users (Age UK, Carers UK, Alzheimer’s Society and SCOPE). Interviews included 
questions about recent reforms of adult social care, challenges to the sector and the 
contribution direct payments might make in improving the experience of service 
users and carers in residential care.  
Interviews were conducted face-to-face or over the telephone and recorded with the 
permission of participants, and later transcribed verbatim. The analysis presented in 
this paper builds on the themes identified in the final report of the evaluation. These 
included descriptive categories that aimed to understand how direct payments were 
implemented in each site (e.g. the number and type of direct payments available; 
processes for facilitating direct payments; the organisation of the financial 
transaction; and how direct payments were used), and themes that explored the 
challenges experienced during the process of setting up and managing direct 
payments (e.g. information provided about direct payments; approaches to 
communication and engagement; difficulties setting up direct payments; and 
concerns about the impacts of direct payments).   
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For this paper, these themes were reanalysed to focus on the views and experiences 
of providers, by bringing together the data collected through the survey and the 
interviews. Themes that stood out were: (1) the motivation of providers to participate 
in the programme; (2) providers’ views on how direct payments were used in their 
homes; (3) the potential of direct payments to promote personalisation of care in 
residential settings; (4) concerns about the financial implications of direct payments 
for care homes; and (5) concerns about potential abuse and failure to safeguard 
residents associated with direct payments.  
 
Results 
Motivation of providers to participate in the Trailblazer programme 
Care home owners and managers interviewed reported that they agreed with the aim 
of the Trailblazers to increase ‘personalisation’ of the care provided in homes. Those 
catering for older people were particularly supportive, noting that this group of 
residents was usually offered fewer choices than younger people in residential 
settings. Managers working in care homes for younger adults also appreciated the 
opportunity to offer more choice of services, although many suggested that their 
facilities already offered a substantial number of options to choose from, such as 
daytime activities. 
This positive sentiment was echoed by representatives of provider associations, who 
argued that it would only be fair if people in residential care had the same access to 
direct payments as people receiving care in their own homes. 
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However, while some managers and owners were happy to support residents who 
wanted to explore direct payments, others were sceptical as to whether direct 
payments would be suitable for their residents, for example, older people with 
advanced dementia.  
Some owners and managers viewed participating in the scheme as an opportunity to 
learn more about direct payments, which they saw as likely to become future policy: 
“I’m of the opinion that if something’s going to come then I would rather 
know what’s coming than be presented with the finished article and say, 
‘look, OK, from tomorrow you’re doing this’.”  (Care home owner 6, Site 4) 
However, some had reconsidered their involvement once it became clear that local 
authorities were unable to provide resources in addition to those already committed 
to paying providers and that any additional choice in services would have to be 
funded from within the current care home fee rate.  
 
How direct payments were used in care homes 
Trailblazer local authorities settled on three models for offering direct payments, 
often arrived at in consultation with providers. Four sites adopted the ‘full’ direct 
payment approach, where the direct payment comprises the total sum of money 
allocated to the service user to pay for her/his residential care, typically based on the 
existing care home fee.  
Four sites made only ‘part’ direct payments available, covering only part of the sum 
previously paid to the care home. The remainder was then managed by the local 
authority to pay for the service user’s care. This option typically involved local 
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authority staff negotiating with care homes whether there was any part of the care 
home fee that could be used to allow the service user more choice. Four sites chose 
to offer both ‘full’ and ‘part’ direct payments.  
Two sites opted for a third model that involved the local authority covering the full 
cost of the care home fee plus an additional sum of money given to the service user 
as a direct payment. This option required additional financial investment from local 
authorities. It was not seen as sustainable beyond the duration of the programme  
and ceased when the programme ended (Ettelt et al., 2017). 
Responses from the provider survey and the interviews suggest that ‘full’ direct 
payments were used to pay for the care home services in their entirety (often 
referred to as the ’care package’). In the survey, four owners and managers stated 
that they had a resident who paid his / her entire fee (minus any private user ‘top-
ups’) through a direct payment.  
One care home owner, on accepting a ‘full’ direct payment to pay for a resident’s 
care home fee package, added:  
“Whether [the care home fee] comes directly from the local authority to us or 
whether it [is by] direct payment, that payment is still the same... because 
care involves your personal care, your continence care, the cleaning of your 
room, your meals, your laundry, in-house activities that we provide, some 
outings that we can cost ourselves O we try not to charge for as much as 
what we can” (Care home manager 1, Site 12) 
In this example the resident had been fully financing the residential care received, 
but had reached the financial threshold for local authority support. The resident had 
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been offered a choice between receiving a direct payment to pay the care home fee 
in full or having the care home fee paid directly to the care home by the local 
authority, neither of which resulted in any additional choice.  
The most common use of a ‘part’ direct payment, reported in the survey by ten 
providers (some of whom had more than one resident with a direct payment), was for 
individually arranged activities outside the care home (n=10), followed by activities 
within the care home (n=4). This experience was confirmed in the interviews with 
managers and owners. Examples of activities paid for by a direct payment included 
trips to the theatre, meals provided by a local charity within the care home (Site 11), 
or visits to a garden centre, museum or park, with light meals in cafes (Site 4).  
Responses to the survey indicated that some care homes already offered a 
substantial variety of activities and choice, particularly care homes for younger 
adults. At interview, a director of a residential care provider with around 100 older 
residents (across several locations) noted that residents were already given a choice 
of activities and services, but felt the introduction of direct payments encouraged the 
care homes to become more creative in the provision of support:   
“Because if we are providing a range of things that people don’t want, if 
people are in receipt of a direct payment they will go elsewhere. So it 
forces our hand to make sure that we change to deliver what people want 
to receive from us.”  (Care home manager 3, Site 7) 
The risk of loss of income from a resident with a direct payment proved to be a 
dilemma for some care homes. They recognised that they would have to improve 
their choice of services, as a ‘part’ direct payment would allow the holder to purchase 
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services outside the home; but they questioned the sustainability of this option given 
that the ‘part’ payment tended to come from the budget that paid the care home fee.  
On one occasion, a family considered using a direct payment to continue employing 
their relative’s personal assistant after she (a young disabled person) moved into a 
care home (Site 6). However, this plan was not realised as the family eventually 
decided against moving their relative to a care home (their reasons were not 
reported to the research team). There were, therefore, no cases reported in which a 
personal assistant was employed in a home.  
 
Potential for direct payments to promote personalisation 
Although many managers and owners stated that they agreed with the aim of 
personalisation, it was not obvious to them that direct payments would lead to more 
choice and control for residents over their services. For those working with recipients 
of a ‘full’ direct payment, it was difficult to see how the direct payment would achieve 
greater choice and control, even though some family members noted that they 
enjoyed feeling more in control of the care provided to their family member.  
Among those working with recipients of ‘part’ direct payments, especially younger 
adults, several indicated that they already offered a substantial number of options 
especially with regard to activities, thereby offering a good level of personalisation. 
This tended to be less straightforward for older people. On a positive note, one 
manager in a home for older people, in which a number of residents received a small 
additional payment to fund activities (£20/month), explained that his staff had 
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developed personal profiles of residents that could be used to discuss possible uses 
of direct payments.   
“Owe did the personal profiles, which looked into what was important to 
them, throughout their life, how we could best support that, within the 
home anyway? And then, say, for instance, we knew that one of our 
gentlemen always used to go to a chippy, that he rates the best chippy in 
[town], so that’s on his outcomes, for us to take him there. And, the other 
lady, that we took to the garden centre, she liked animalsOshe used to 
like the garden ... And we asked, we just asked them, we have an idea, 
and we just say, what do you think?” (Care home manager 6, Site 4)  
In this case, participating in the programme provided the inspiration to test other 
methods of personalising care.    
However, for many / most managers and owners of care homes for older people the 
verdict was less positive. Some respondents feared the direct payments initiative 
could exacerbate inequalities in adult social care, given the differences between the 
amount of funding available for younger adults and for older people in residential 
care. 
In addition, some felt that direct payments were blurring the line between the care 
needs of service users, which are assessed formally and on which funding is 
allocated, and their ‘wants’, i.e. their personal preferences that may go beyond these 
needs. While it was desirable to accommodate the preferences of individuals as 




“I think it would be lovely to have a model of social care that everybody 
could have what they want. But it is down to the budget at the end of the 
day, and the budget is not there.” (Care home manager 2, Site 7) 
In a survey response, a manager of a care home, which had three residents holding 
direct payments covering part of the fee, said that the direct payment system was 
“based more on want than need”, but that funding these ‘wants’ risked taking away 
funding that should be used to meet the needs of others:  
“Whilst we try hard to ensure everyone gets a range of weekly social 
activities, this one individual [with a direct payment] gets a much larger 
range of activities and holidays, in my view, far in excess of what 
someone of his age range would be experiencing out in 'the world'. My 
concern is that as increasing amounts of social care money are being 
used to fund 'wants' for the few, the ability for local councils to fund basic 
needs for the most will diminish.” (Care home manager/owner, Site 11)  
This viewpoint was echoed in one interview with an owner of a care home for older 
people, a registered charity, who explained that the decision not to take part in the 
Trailblazer programme was mainly driven by discussions with the residents’ families, 
who feared that personalising care, and thus potentially redistributing funding 
between residents, would undermine the charitable purpose of the home.  
“[A local authority officer] came in and explained it all. I’d given the 
residents’ families the paperwork beforehand for them to have a look at, 
had a conversation with one of them on the phone about it at my home 
here. But they took the view that [the care home] could be damaged by 
this, that it’s a charity, it’s putting all its money back in, has no profit at the 
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end of the year, puts all its money back into care. They were concerned 
there was the potential for [the care home] to be damaged financially, and 
they said it’s like takingO one lady said it’s like if somebody on the corner 
is shaking a tin, it’s like grabbing the tin and running off with it - quote, 
unquote.” (Care home manager 4, Site 8) 
Care home owners and managers also voiced doubts about the potential of direct 
payments to improve choice and control for those with limited or fluctuating mental 
capacity to make their own decisions, for example, those with severe learning 
disabilities, cognitive impairment associated with advanced degenerative disease 
and older people in the later stages of dementia. While they agreed that individuals 
should be provided with personalised services, they were not convinced that 
improved choice could be facilitated by a direct payment. For example, a manager of 
a home whose residents had advanced dementia suggested that giving people time 
to dress themselves to the best of their ability would be more desirable than dressing 
them, yet the latter would be more time-consuming:  
“Am I going to let them struggle dressing themselves? That is 
personalisation in a day-to-day running of a care home, instead of doing 
everything for them. It is very difficult to explain. A direct payment does 
not automatically mean, for me, personalisation.” (Care home manager 7, 
Site 4) 
In this example, choice was embedded in routine care rather than seen as an 
additional service that could be purchased alongside usual care. It was seen as a 
relational aspect of compassionate, good quality care. A manager working with 
younger adults with learning disabilities also noted that in some circumstances 
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choices might need to be simplified to support residents with limited cognitive 
capacity. Such examples highlighted that, from the perspective of providers, direct 
payments were not necessarily a suitable means to improve choice and control for 
all residents, with some choices potentially more compatible with direct payments 
than others.  
 
Perceived financial risks for care homes 
Care home managers and owners were concerned about the potential risks to their 
finances arising from direct payments. This was a particular problem for homes 
caring for residents in receipt of a ‘part’ payment taken from the current care home 
fee. In some instances, this concern about finances led providers to exit the 
Trailblazer scheme. In two sites, to ameliorate these concerns, a small additional 
sum was negotiated with Trailblazer local authorities to be made available as a direct 
payment. This resulted in the third model of delivering direct payments, involving 
additional costs for local authorities, described above. However, care home 
managers with residents receiving a ‘full’ direct payment felt less at risk, as the 
resident was expected to cover the care home fee in full with his / her direct 
payment, although some feared that family members could be tempted to spend the 
money elsewhere.  
The concern about losing money from having residents with ‘part’ direct payments 
was also expressed by a representative of a national provider organisation: 
“So if a council gives £500 – I’m just plucking a figure out of the air – to 
that care home for my place currently, if they now say ‘we’re going to 
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transfer that into a direct payment but, oh, by the way, we’ve now worked 
that out and we think that that should be £400’. Of course that’s going to 
have an impact. It’s going to seriously undermine the business and the 
person won’t be able to pay.” (National organisation 7) 
The risk of losing money through direct payments was particularly unacceptable to 
those care home managers and owners who felt that the level of funding received for 
local authority-supported residents was already below what it cost them to provide 
the care:  
“The direct payment will not make things better for providers. It won’t. The 
only thing that will make things better is if there is a full and honest review 
of care home fees in an objective, honest, open, transparent way and 
there is recognition that local authority fees are too low and that the 
industry has been subsidised by the 40-odd percent of the people who 
pay private fees.” (Care home owner 6, Site 4). 
It was not clear how the ‘part’ direct payment would fit with the current approach to 
allocating funding, with one care home manager suggesting that the direct payment 
should be decoupled from the care home fee entirely and provided as an additional 
payment earmarked for activities. Such an approach is currently more common for 
younger adults who receive separate funding for day services, but this is typically not 
available to older people.  
One survey respondent noted that delivering direct payments could result in 
additional administrative costs, for example, due to extra invoicing, and it was not 
clear who was responsible for these costs. If they were to be taken from the (part) 
direct payment itself, this would reduce the amount available to service users even 
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further. Others, however, noted in interviews that they were already billing service 
users for additional services and that the same approach could be used for part 
direct payments. Another owner of a home for older people (Care home owner 6, 
Site 4) noted that his staff already found it difficult to keep adequate records of 
essential care provided to residents, reflecting competing demands on their time and 
attention. Breaking these services into individual elements that could be invoiced 
separately would require small actions to be scrupulously recorded, which was seen 
as unrealistic.  
‘Itemising’ care homes bills seemed less of a problem for some of the care homes for 
younger adults, although here the direct payment related only to day services which 
the care home had already priced individually, and for which it received separate 
funding. However, there was similar scepticism in these homes about whether it 
would be possible and appropriate to break down costs for core services (e.g. 
personal care) delivered by the homes. 
It was also argued that, in the context of the current severe constraints on the level 
of public funding of care, any approach to personalising services would be more 
costly than currently provided care, especially for older people whose needs were 
not always adequately met by the public funding available to them:  
“Well, any personalised care could cost more, but then it might cost less in 
other areasO If you just got the one rate fits all, which it does for older 
people – far less for younger adults with learning disabilities, of course – 
you will get a far bigger range in terms of what their personal care needs 
are. But the more that’s put in people’s hands, they might find ways to be 
more effective and efficient with their money, but personalised care 
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currently, if you just look at the costs of care studies and what’s funded, it 
absolutely means that the costs will have to rise to fund, but it might be 
different for each person.”  (National organisation 3) 
This concern was echoed by several other home managers and owners who 
wondered how additional services would be paid for. This was particularly seen as a 
challenge if direct payment holders were to opt out of services provided communally, 
for example, meals or laundry. These services would still have to be provided by the 
care home to other residents, yet without the funding from residents who decided to 
pay for their own meals or services. The same applied if individuals were to use their 
direct payment to pay for a personal assistant, as the care home still needed to 
provide adequate staff cover to comply with minimum staffing requirements:  
“They are paying for the hotel costs. They are not paying for care. What if 
they have a fall? They are in dementia homes. What if two people get into 
a fight? What if somebody gets really agitated? We have had people 
waking up one morning saying ‘Where am I? Where am I, who are you, 
how have I got here?’ [O] So that requires a lot of one-to-one 
reassurance, a lot of time. Are we going to bill them separately for that?” 
(Care home owner 8, Site 4) 
 
Concerns about abuse and safeguarding 
Some managers and owners mentioned their concern about risks of financial abuse 
and safeguarding, echoing concerns voiced in the domiciliary care sector 
(Manthorpe et al., 2011).   
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The potential for financial abuse of direct payments in residential care was seen as 
arising from direct payments being used in ways that were not seen to be in the best 
interests of the resident, either because the resident had made a decision without a 
complete understanding of the consequences, or because family members opted to 
decide on behalf the resident, but against the judgement of the care home staff. This 
concern was particularly voiced by care home managers working with people with 
cognitive limitations: 
“I do feel that you go back into this risk of financial abuse because so 
many of the residents here are not able to manage their finances. They 
can’t. That’s it. It’s managed by family members. And it is very difficult for 
us, I suppose, because if families just provide the basics, who are we to 
say, you should be providing this, that or the other?” (Care home manager 
4, Site 7) 
In a hypothetical example, one interviewee expressed concern about residents or 
family members potentially spending their entire budget on something else (Care 
home manager 7, Site 4), if they were given direct payments covering several 
months’ worth of care home fees. Some care home owners and managers feared 
that the financial risks they faced could be exacerbated by the possibility of residents 
defaulting on payments to the care home. However, others argued that this would 
not be so different from working with self-funders, although arguably some of the 
financial risk was buffered by the higher rates paid by self-funders compared to 
many local authority funded residents. A small number of managers and owners also 
wondered whether allowing residents to use their direct payments to pay for personal 
assistants would threaten their ability to safeguard residents of the home. As one 
manager pointed out it was initially unclear whether an additional care assistant 
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coming into the home would need to be vetted by the home, and to what extent there 
was a requirement for supervision, so that the home could exercise its statutory 
responsibilities vis-à-vis the service user employing the assistant and the other 
residents of the home.  
“[If a resident employs a personal care assistant] We have to then look at 
what the implications are, of them coming into what is our registered 
service, which we hold the registered manager in responsibilities and 
accountabilities for, so we would still have to ensure that they’ve gone 
through the same processes of DBS [Disclosure and Barring Service] and 
stuff like that, so it’s how that is managed, so that they don’t actually put 
our organisation at risk. And it’s also making sure that the CQC [Care 
Quality Commission] are on board with that, and I know we’ve been trying 
to clarify that with CQC.” (Care home manager 6, Site 8) 
However, during the Trailblazer programme, this problem did not materialise as no 
personal assistant was employed using a direct payment within a care home.   
 
Discussion 
The survey and interviews of care home managers and owners provide some insight 
into the perspectives of providers involved in the Direct Payments in Residential 
Care Trailblazers programme. While they agreed that residential care could, or even 
should, be more personalised, especially for older people, many care home owners 
and managers doubted whether direct payments were compatible with the current 
approach to funding and delivering residential care. Owners and managers agreed 
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that direct payments could provide some individuals with enhanced choice and 
control, for example, in relation to having increased options for day activities. Yet, 
they also wondered whether direct payments would be able to facilitate meaningful 
choices for some residents, especially those with limited capacity to make their own 
decisions and who might rely on others (e.g. family members, carers) to make 
choices for them.  
While some concerns chimed with those voiced in relation to direct payments in 
domiciliary care (Glendinning et al., 2008, Manthorpe et al., 2009), some issues were 
specific to residential care, and the ways in which care delivered in care homes is 
currently funded and organised. Owners and managers worried how direct payments 
would be implemented in care homes, both with regard to identifying services that 
residents would want to spend their direct payments on, and in relation to 
determining the costs of such services (i.e. to produce an ‘itemised’ bill for each 
individual with a direct payment). These issues were not relevant to residents with 
‘full’ direct payments, used to pay for the entire care home fee (i.e. the care home 
‘package’); but it also became clear that this option would be unlikely to provide any 
additional choice and personalisation to such residents. Although some family 
members thought that they could use the direct payment as leverage if the needs of 
service users were not being met, this could not be observed in practice during the 
trailblazers. In the case of ‘part’ payments, care homes needed to determine which 
part of the total fee to release as the direct payment. This appeared to be most 
straightforward in homes that already costed individual services, although these 
were mostly activities for younger adults. For other care homes, particularly smaller 




Care home providers also questioned whether direct payments were compatible with 
current funding arrangements, both in terms of how care home fees were currently 
determined and in terms of the lack of financial flexibility within fees for any particular 
individual placement, given the current reduction in public spending on adult social 
care. For them, the idea of more flexibility had to be weighed against the potential 
risks associated with direct payments, echoing earlier observations of risk aversion 
in the sector (Andrews and Phillips, 2000). More specifically, owners and managers 
perceived at least three types of risk, perhaps explaining why few decided to 
participate in the scheme. The first was the risk of losing income from users with a 
direct payment. This risk could come in two forms: by allowing service users to 
spend part of the money allocated to them on services provided outside the home (if 
provided as a part direct payment); or by having to provide more choice in the form 
of additional or more expensive services, while receiving the same fee (as a full 
direct payment). The second risk identified by providers related to the possibility of 
service users or their families misusing the funding provided to them as a direct 
payment. Such concerns had also been voiced by providers involved in the earlier 
English social care Individual Budget pilots (Glendinning et al, 2008), although in 
practice cases of fraud have been rare in social care (Glasby et al., 2009). A third 
risk was a risk to safeguarding if service users deployed their direct payment in a 
way that would potentially put them or other residents in the home at risk, again 
echoing earlier concerns in domiciliary care (Glendinning et al, 2008). This concern 
was especially mentioned when considering the possibility of allowing residents to 
employ their own care assistants, with providers wondering how such additional staff 
would be vetted and supervised if not formally employed by the home.  
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Our data do not suggest that any of these risks materialised during the Trailblazer 
programme. This may be because only 71 offers of direct payments were accepted 
during its two-and-a-half years. For the 29 direct payments that were still in place in 
March 2016, 19 were ‘full’ direct payments, which were used to cover the care home 
fee in its entirety, thus minimising the financial risk to care homes. To our knowledge, 
no personal assistant was employed by a resident. Interviews with local authority 
programme leads and family members, reported elsewhere, also suggested that 
some providers who were initially supportive opted out of the scheme as the financial 
risks became clearer to them (Ettelt et al., 2017), although the exact reasons are 
likely to be varied.   
These risks were seen in the context of the financial pressures on the residential 
care sector. Reporting on the introduction of a nursing voucher scheme in Valencia, 
Angeles Tortosa and Granell concluded that the scheme could offer more choice but 
it did so by increasing the costs of care (Angeles Tortosa and Granell, 2002). It 
seems possible, although this cannot be demonstrated directly, that direct payments 
would have received a warmer welcome from providers if the financial climate had 
been less challenging. However, as things stood, most local authorities involved in 
the Trailblazer programme had little room to allow for any additional spending when 
embarking on the programme, with only two authorities making small amounts of 
additional funding available for the duration of the programme in an effort to attract 
more service users and care homes to the scheme. This raises the question as to 
whether choice and control in care homes can be improved by way of direct 
payments without incurring additional costs, which is problematic within a climate of 





The perspective of providers supports the overall conclusion of the Trailblazer 
evaluation that direct payments did not result in more personalised services in 
residential care, mostly because of the constraints represented by the financial and 
organisational arrangements underpinning residential care. Offering direct payments 
to care home residents would appear to redress the inequity between recipients of 
domiciliary and residential care identified by the Law Commission (2011) but did not, 
in practice, significantly improve their scope for greater choice and control.   
Providers also identified a number of risks in direct payments, including risks to their 
financial sustainability and their duty to safeguard residents.  
Introducing direct payments in residential care more widely is likely to meet 
significant resistance from some providers, perhaps particularly so if Government 
were to introduce ‘part’ payments at the expense of the existing financial support for 
the care home fee. ‘Full’ direct payments may address the financial concerns of 
providers, but they have very limited potential to improve choice and control for 
residents. The difficulty of implementing the Direct Payments in Residential Care 
Trailblazers may have been exacerbated by the prevailing financial climate which 
had suppressed care home fees over many years, although it is not clear whether, 
and, at what level, additional funding would make (part) direct payments more 
acceptable to care homes and more valuable for care home residents.  
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